Mining and indigenous rights in Sweden:what is at stake and the role for legislation by Tarras-Wahlberg, Håkan & Southalan, John
                                                                    
University of Dundee
Mining and indigenous rights in Sweden










Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Link to publication in Discovery Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Tarras-Wahlberg, H., & Southalan, J. (2021). Mining and indigenous rights in Sweden: what is at stake and the
role for legislation. Mineral Economics. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13563-021-00280-5
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in Discovery Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with
these rights.
 • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from Discovery Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
 • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain.
 • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.





Mining and indigenous rights in Sweden: what is at stake and the role 
for legislation
Håkan Tarras‑Wahlberg1  · John Southalan2 
Received: 10 March 2021 / Accepted: 23 July 2021 
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
Mining and the permitting process for mineral projects in Sweden has been criticised as inadequately safeguarding the rights 
of Indigenous reindeer herding Sámi, who hold usufruct rights to more than half the country’s territory. There have been 
calls for Sweden to ratify the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (ILO 169) and to change its Mineral Law. This paper 
evaluates the extent of protection of Sámi rights — and not only those engaged in reindeer herding — in Sweden’s minerals 
permitting process. It also considers the implications if changes were made to align this process with the Indigenous-rights 
framework. The paper demonstrates that reindeer herding Sámi are, broadly, treated similar to landowners in the mineral 
projects permitting process. However, there is discrimination when it comes to being able to have a share in the benefits of a 
project: impacted reindeer herders have no such option whereas landowners do. Also, the permitting processes do not con-
sider social and cultural impacts, nor are there obligations for the state to be sufficiently involved in consultation processes. 
Addressing the identified shortcomings would require only small changes to the Mineral Law and/or to its application and 
would be possible with only limited impacts on mining because the sector is not a significant user of land whilst it creates 
large economic values. However, extending those changes (to give parity between landowners and Sámi rights holders) in 
other important economic sectors which use more extensive land areas, would entail a considerable transfer of resources 
and associated power. Furthermore, changing the Mineral Law specifically would mean little in terms of safeguarding the 
rights of the majority of Sami who do not engage in reindeer herding. This suggests that calls for changes to mineral-related 
legislation to resolve indigenous land right issues are mis-directed or at least insufficient, and that other type of legislative 
change is required, fundamentally including resolving how extensive and strong the Sámi’s rights to land should be.
Keywords Mining · Sami · Indigenous rights · Sweden
Introduction
Conflicts between the extractive sector and indigenous peo-
ples have long been a subject of study and interest, and ini-
tially most researchers focused on the Americas, South East 
Asia and Australia (Downing et al. 2002; Warden-Fernandez 
2001). But in more recent times, the geographical focus has 
widened to also include the Nordic countries and Sweden 
which is the subject of this paper (Carstens 2016; Lassila 
2018; Lawrence and Moritz 2019; Persson et al. 2017; Raitio 
et al. 2020; Wilson 2019).
The international recognition of indigenous peoples’ 
rights has increased in recent decades. The most important 
guiding documents on the state’s responsibilities in this 
regard include the Convention concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (ILO 169 1989) 
and the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indig-
enous Peoples (UNDRIP 2007). Other UN instruments 
of relevance include the Covenants on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR 1976) and the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (ICERD, 1969), as well as the Dec-
laration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National 
or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities (1992). 
Further, the scope of indigenous rights as defined in these 
UN treaties is addressed in the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights (UN 2011), which extends the 
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responsibility for safeguarding indigenous rights to compa-
nies and businesses.
Sweden often promotes human and indigenous rights 
internationally. Sweden voted in favour of UNDRIP at the 
UN General Assembly in 2007 and is a signatory to both 
ICCPR and ICERD. Sweden is, however, not a signatory 
to ILO169, and the country has also received significant 
international criticism regarding indigenous and minor-
ity rights-related issues (see “International assessments 
of Sweden” section below). Sweden’s apparent reticence 
in implementing key parts of the international rights 
framework “at home” for its indigenous Sámi represents 
a conundrum for some researchers (e.g. Lawrence and 
Moritz 2019; Mörkenstam 2019). In this regard, conflicts 
between mining and Sámi rights have attracted particular 
interest. Mining has been characterised as a method for 
colonisation (Lawrence and Åhrén 2017), whilst others 
have reported a lack of adequate consultation with Sámi 
in the permitting process (Lawrence and Moritz 2019). 
Conflicts that relate to specific mining projects and appeals 
by Sámi rights holders have been delaying permitting pro-
cesses for mining projects (Beland Lindahl et al. 2016; 
Persson et al. 2017), and the Sami parliament of Sweden 
has also called for a moratorium for new mineral exploita-
tion until such a time that ILO169 is ratified (Sametinget 
2014). This, in turn, has contributed to calls for changes to 
be made to the mining legislative framework by research-
ers (e.g. Kløcker Larsen et al. 2018; Raitio et al. 2020) and 
more generally contributed to the government assessing 
the consequences of implementing stronger rights for the 
Sámi (SWE Gov 2015; SWE Gov 2019). Much of the focus 
of researchers and Sami representatives in this regard is 
placed on arguing that Sweden should ratify ILO169 and 
change its Mineral Law (SFS 1991; Kløcker Larsen et al. 
2017; Sametinget 2014), rather than proposing wider legal 
reforms of the legal system. Furthermore, there has been 
comparatively less consideration for what the political 
stakes and full consequences of such proposed changes 
might be.
This paper aims to:
 (i) Investigate the extent to which indigenous rights — 
particularly as defined by UNDRIP and ILO169 — is 
provided for in the current Swedish minerals permit-
ting process and the associated implications
 (ii) Consider the stakes if Sweden was to fully implement 
the international indigenous rights framework — and 
thereby better understand the reticence by govern-
ment in doing so, with a special focus on mining
Based on our findings in this regard, we also consider 
how Sweden could approach implementing an indigenous-
rights framework in relation to mining specifically, but 
also in more general terms. However, as the focus is on the 
Mining Law and indigenous rights, other legal instruments 
of relevance are treated more cursorily.
Our analysis focusses on the mining permitting process 
because, in Sweden, this includes the important aspects of 
consultation, establishes the mechanisms for compensa-
tion, and also the allocation of land for mining. We thus 
compare the procedural rights of the indigenous Sámi to 
that of other relevant stakeholders in the permitting pro-
cess for mineral projects. Second, we assess whether the 
protection of Sámi interests in these processes is in line 
with the existing international indigenous rights frame-
work more broadly. We further examine what the political 
stakes and consequences of any reform which align Swe-
den with the indigenous rights framework, specifically for 
the Sámi and the mining sector but also more generally, 
in an effort to better understand the apparent reservations 
of the Swedish state to fully implement said framework. 
This is performed by exploring some key data sourced 
from publicly available sources that relate to land use, and 
to the relative economic importance of different sectors of 
the national economy, and by studying relevant research 
that relates to impacts on reindeer herding activities by 
other anthropogenic activities.
Existing standards and procedures
Relevant international standards and practice
Contemporary international approaches to mining regula-
tion emphasise the importance of the state achieving a 
balance between the benefits and impacts of mining. Sig-
nificantly, the emphasis is not about structuring the com-
munity/society role to enable mining, but rather structur-
ing mining to contribute to the community/society. This 
is evident in recent industry, international and academic 
guidance around mining. By way of example, a 2016 
framework from the OECD about extractives projects iden-
tified the first step, for collaboration between the state, the 
sector and civil society, being to identify “a comprehen-
sive long-term vision and implementation strategy to build 
competitive and diversified economies and create in -coun-
try shared value out of natural resources” (OECD 2016a, 
10). More recently, in 2020, the OECD issued Guiding 
Principles for Durable Extractive Contracts. The first (of 
eight) principles is that “durable extractives contracts are 
aligned with the long–term vision and strategy, defined 
by the host government on how the extractive sector can 
fit into and contribute to broader sustainable development 
objectives” (OECD 2020, 2). This type of approach is 
repeatedly emphasised in other guidance, from:
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• The mining industry (e.g. Mining Association of Canada 
(MAC 2019) and International Council on Mining and 
Metals (ICMM 2020))
• Inter-governmental and international guidance on mining 
(e.g. IGF (2013); UNEP (2018); UNDP (2018); Interna-
tional Resource Panel (2020))
• Academic and practitioner expertise, e.g. the 2014 Natu-
ral Resources Charter from the Natural Resource Gov-
ernance Institute (NRGI 2014)
In this paper, we are concerned with the international 
indigenous rights framework, which forms part of the gen-
eral UN led framework of universal human rights. One 
way of understanding how indigenous rights relate to more 
general human rights is defined by the Danish Institute for 
Human Rights (DIHR 2019, 5) where it is stated that indige-
nous peoples’ rights are not “special rights that are exclusive 
to indigenous peoples. Rather, they are the articulation of 
universal human rights as they apply to indigenous peoples” 
with the aim to “ensuring equality between indigenous peo-
ples and other sectors of society”.
The two international standards most directly relevant 
to Indigenous-mining issues are ILO169 and UNDRIP. As 
at July 2021, 24 countries had joined ILO160, making it 
binding on them in international law. When the UN General 
Assembly adopted UNDRIP in 2007, four countries with 
well-established domestic legal regimes concerning indig-
enous rights opposed this: Australia, Canada, New Zealand 
and the USA.1 Each State has since withdrawn their initial 
opposition, with various caveats (Anaya and Rodríguez-
Piñero 2018, 60), but are not necessarily incorporating 
UNDRIP domestically. This indicates some unease about 
the consistency and relation between their domestic systems 
and UNDRIP.
In relation to indigenous rights, UNDRIP and ILO169 
have been considered in the development of standards in 
other documents, such as OECD Guidelines on Multina-
tional Enterprises and also those that are concerned specifi-
cally with mining (e.g. ICMM 2015; IFC 2012; World Bank 
2016). These assist in summarising the main requirements in 
international law and practice regarding mining and interac-
tion with indigenous rights to land and resources.
UNDRIP and ILO169 include several articles that relate 
to indigenous people’s right to self-determination, and con-
trol of their lands and territories or resources that they have 
traditionally owned or occupied. It is stated in both docu-
ments that no dispossession or relocation may occur without 
just and fair compensation and redress. Article 15 in ILO 
169 is especially relevant to mining in that it stipulates that 
indigenous people’s rights to natural resources shall be spe-
cially safeguarded, and that: “…. in cases in which the State 
retains the ownership of mineral or sub-surface resources, 
governments shall establish or maintain procedures for con-
sultation, with a view to ascertaining whether and to what 
degree their interests would be prejudiced, before permitting 
exploration or exploitation”.
The aspect of UNDRIP which has received most attention 
relates to procedures for consultation, and it is the concept of 
“free prior informed consent” (or FPIC) and its implications 
for resource development (Coates and Favel 2016, 1). That 
is, regardless of any consultation obligations in ILO 169, 
UNDRIP outlines a requirement that activities which may 
affect indigenous people can only go ahead, with their prior 
free and informed consent. Importantly, the significance of 
impacts (to what extent an indigenous people is affected) are 
not considered or elaborated upon in UNDRIP.
FPIC is primarily a standard for states and to proceed 
with and/or give permission to a project without FPIC would 
require strong reasons indeed. According to the Special Rap-
porteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya 
(UN 2013), such reasons include that (i) that it can be con-
clusively established that the activities will not substantially 
affect indigenous peoples’ rights or (ii) where there is a valid 
public purpose, which in turn needs to be proportional to the 
limitations imposed, and must not include revenue raising or 
commercial interests. This, in turn, provides some guidance 
but at the same time requires careful consideration of what 
it means to “substantially affect indigenous peoples’ rights”.
FPIC has also become a standard for companies primar-
ily through its adoption in specific instruments such as the 
IFC Performance Standards, ICMM’s Mining Principles and 
various voluntary sustainability initiatives.
There is ambiguity in the international law regarding 
responsibilities concerning impacts on indigenous people. 
There is agreed wording about FPIC, but there is no con-
sensus on what that means (or requires) in different situa-
tions. FPIC’s most extensive enumeration is in UNDRIP, 
but there are two constraints on the extent of that legal 
guidance for countries. First, as a declaration, UNDRIP is 
not binding on nations.2 Conversely, it appears that FPIC 
is increasingly becoming an expected standard for compa-
nies, through its adoption in specific instruments such as 
the IFC Performance Standards, ICMM’s Mining Principles 
and various voluntary sustainability initiatives, as well as to 
some extent from the implications of more general human 
1 Each specifically explained their opposition at the time to the UN, 
referencing a perceived incompatibility of FPIC with their domestic 
legal and democratic systems (UN 2007), 11–15.
2 There is, of course, customary international law; and parts of 
UNDRIP are said to represent customary international law (and 
therefore describe obligations on states: e.g. (ILA 2012), [2]; (Anaya 
and Rodríguez-Piñero 2018), 62).
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rights standards as those laid out in guides from the OECD 
(OECD 2016b) and (OECD 2017). The second constraint on 
UNDRIP’s FPIC text providing legal direction for nations 
is the “elusive language…[which represents] a compromise 
solution” evidently necessary to achieve sufficient support 
from the various parties: (Barelli 2018, 249); (Young 2019, 
87–88); (Errico 2018, 426–437); (Charters 2018, 403).
For legally binding obligations on nations, these come 
from treaties/conventions. Most relevant here are the con-
ventions on racial discrimination (especially regarding 
equality and property rights) and civil/political rights (espe-
cially concerning cultural rights). Treaty bodies, in explicat-
ing and implementing these conventions, have not provided a 
clear threshold for how significant an impact must be before 
it constitutes a breach in the absence of the relevant indig-
enous group’s consent or adequate processes/remediation, 
e.g. Raitio et al. (2020, 5). For instance, the Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination stated in 1997 that 
its treaty requires nations to “Ensure … that no decisions 
directly relating to their [members of indigenous peoples] 
rights and interests are taken without their informed con-
sent” (Gen Rec 23 CERD 1997, 4(d)). This was similar to the 
Human Rights Committee’s statement in 1994 that its treaty 
provided that “The enjoyment of those [indigenous cultural] 
rights may require positive legal measures of protection and 
measures to ensure the effective participation of members 
of minority communities in decisions which affect them”: 
(Gen Com 23 CCPR 1994, 7). However the jurisprudence 
from these bodies — their decisions concerning specific 
complaints — shows more nuance in what is (and is not) 
compliance. The relevant principles from these decisions 
are these.
• The protected cultural rights will be breached if a devel-
opment threatens the way of life and culture of an Indig-
enous group (Ominayak -v- CAN 1990) [33], or has 
impacts which amount to a denial of the right (Länsman 
-v- FIN 1996) [10.3]. That impact may result from the 
combined effects of actions or measures over a period of 
time and in more than one area, making it necessary to 
consider the overall effects of any measures on the ability 
of the indigenous people concerned to continue to enjoy 
their culture (Länsman -v- FIN 2005) [10.2].
• It is a breach to endanger the very survival of the commu-
nity and its members (Poma Poma -v- PER 2009) [7.6]. 
However measures that have limited impact on the way 
of life and the livelihood of indigenous persons will not 
necessarily constitute a breach (Länsman -v- FIN 1994) 
[9.4]. The question is whether the impact is so substantial 
that it does effectively deny the right to enjoy their cul-
tural rights in that region (Länsman -v- FIN 1994) [9.5].
• Where an individual disputes state laws or measures 
which have been adopted for the preservation and well-
being of group as a whole, those measure will not breach 
cultural human rights where the objectives and measures 
are reasonable (Kitok -v- SWE 1988, 9.8).
• The acceptability of measures that affect or interfere with 
the culturally significant economic activities of a minor-
ity depends on whether the members of the minority in 
question have had the opportunity to participate in the 
decision-making process in relation to these measures 
(Mahuika -v- NZL 2000) [9.5].
• Opportunity to participate involves more than just con-
sultation, and where measures substantially compromise 
or interfere with culturally significant activities, this 
requires “not mere consultation but the free, prior and 
informed consent of the members of the community” 
(Poma Poma -v- PER 2009) [7.6].
It is difficult to fully reconcile or synthesise these various 
international standards and decisions. But it is necessary to 
attempt that, if international law is to help analyse and guide 
national laws and policies. Ambiguities around FPIC are not 
Sweden-specific and are widely acknowledged (e.g. (NOR 
NCP 2016, 15); (Raitio et al. 2020, 5); (Newman 2017, 
12–16)). Our understanding of the relevant international 
law is this. The promotion and protection of indigenous 
rights have increased over time. Despite some uncertainty 
and disagreement about FPIC’s application at its extremes, 
there are some generally-accepted basics when impartial 
evaluations are made as to whether the requirements of FPIC 
have been met. There is an emphasis on the process (con-
sultation and its objective) not always an outcome (consent). 
There is, currently, an expectation that consent should be 
sought before any measures which may impact indigenous 
people. But, if that consent does not exist, an indigenous 
rights breach only arises where the measure significantly 
impacts the indigenous group’s property or cultural rights. 
Failure to even attempt to reach consent has been identi-
fied as an indigenous rights breach, but only in cases where 
there was also significant impact (e.g. Poma Poma -v- PER 
(2009), Ågren -v- SWE (2020)). There is no precedent of a 
case adjudging a breach of indigenous rights where there 
was failure to attempt to reach consent and the measure had 
only limited impact.
Above, we summarised the essential requirements 
related to indigenous rights and associated procedures, 
and the question now is to what extent are these observed 
in the regulation of mineral projects in Sweden? To 
answer this question, we need to understand some basic 
facts about the Sámi, reindeer herding and mining, and 
how these are regulated, as well as how the international 
rights framework in more general terms is catered for in 
the Swedish legal system.
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The Swedish Sámi and their rights
Sweden has a civil law system, which like the other Nordic 
countries include significant aspects of common law (Ort-
wein, 2003). In contrast to some other European legal sys-
tems, there is no fundamental constitutional document based 
on a declaration of rights of citizens. The Instrument of Gov-
ernment most closely resembles such a document, and it 
provides that public power shall be exercised to ensure uni-
versal human equality and individual freedom and dignity. 
However, a wider (human) rights perspective has historically 
had comparatively little importance, and the regulatory sys-
tem has been developed gradually and over a long period, 
mainly based on positivistic and pragmatic consideration 
(Axberger, 2018b). Axberger (2018b) argues that this is one 
of the main reasons why Sweden supports the human rights 
framework internationally as a way to pursue certain politi-
cal goals, whilst at the same time being comparatively slow 
and/or in some cases unwilling to incorporate a (human) 
rights approach in domestic legislation. Sweden has a dualist 
system, which means treaties must be interpreted, adapted 
and transferred into national law, before implementation. 
Aspects of conventions that have not (yet) been incorpo-
rated in law, and even declarations can however be judged as 
being relevant in adjudications (Axberger, 2018a; Axberger, 
2018b). However, if there is a conflict between an inter-
national convention and existing Swedish laws, the latter 
prevails in Swedish courts.
Swedish government policy precludes the possibility of 
ethnicity-based censuses, but existing estimates suggest that 
the Sámi number is between 20,000 and 35,000 (out of a 
Sweden’s total population of 10 million). The history of the 
Sámi includes many negative aspects of colonisation and/or 
discrimination including examples of forced labour (notably 
when some Sami where obliged to transport ore from mines 
in the 1700s), cultural assimilation, forced relocation and 
racism (e.g. Lundmark 2008). However, there were also his-
toric periods and aspects when the relationship between the 
Sámi, the Swedes and other minorities (notably the Torneda-
lians in northern Sweden, who also have been the subject 
to significant discrimination) was respectful and beneficial 
and when access to at least some land has been shared (e.g. 
Persson 2007).
Until fairly recently, Swedish policy towards the Sámi 
was rooted in the vestiges of racism and of an overarching 
intention that non-nomadic Sámi (as well as other minorities, 
such as the Tornedalians) should be assimilated, whereas 
nomadic Sámi should follow a separate and restricted devel-
opment path based on traditional reindeer herding. It was 
only in the last few decades of the twentieth century that this 
discriminatory and colonial heritage began to be addressed 
in earnest. Thus, the Sámi was acknowledged as an “origi-
nal population” of Sweden in 1976 (SWE Plmnt 1976), and 
rights to some self-determination has subsequently been 
introduced in an amendment to the constitution where it is 
stated that “opportunities shall be promoted for the Sámi 
people and for ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities to 
preserve and develop a cultural and social life of their own” 
(SWE Plmnt 2010).
A popularly elected Sámi parliament was inaugurated in 
1993, although with a limited remit of monitoring and man-
aging specific issues related to reindeer herding and Sámi 
culture, which does not reach the objective of providing any 
significant level of self-determination (e.g. Baer 2005). Fur-
thermore, voter registration and turnout remain low,3 which 
affects legitimacy. Nevertheless, the progress made led to an 
official government report concluding that by 1999, Sweden 
fulfilled “the requirements set out in the Convention (169) 
in most respects” (one would expect that this means that the 
Sámi has been afforded the basic indigenous rights including 
preservation of, language, religion, and cultural heritage), 
with the “main stumbling block being the rules concerning 
Sámi land rights”: (SWE Gov 2015). The Swedish govern-
ment has been preparing a legislative proposal for improved 
consultation with Sámi communities and organisations, in 
an attempt to address the requirements of FPIC (SWE Gov 
2019).
Sweden’s legal system has only traditionally recognised 
and protected Sami land rights when these rights are tied to 
reindeer herding. Only a small minority of the Sámi, namely 
those about 4,600 individuals that belong to a “sameby” (a 
cooperative organisation, that engages in reindeer herding), 
have rights to use land and to keep reindeer, whereas the 
majority of those with Sámi heritage have no such rights. 
However, they do indirectly, as it is stated in the constitution 
that: “the Sámi people’s rights to perform reindeer herding 
is to be regulated through law”. In essence, this means that 
whereas only the Sámi may engage in reindeer herding, rela-
tively few of those with Sámi heritage actually do, and only 
some 2,500 individuals have reindeer herding as their main 
livelihood (Sametinget 2020).
Reindeer herding is pursued over extensive areas, cover-
ing nearly half of Sweden, and it is regulated by the Reindeer 
herding Law (1971:437) which divides the northern half of 
Sweden between 51 different samebyar (one sameby, several 
samebyar). These samebyar, in turn, each encompass geo-
graphical areas where reindeer may graze (pasture areas), a 
form of communal work arrangement and a business entity.
Sámi rights over land have been tried in important and 
landmark cases in the Swedish courts, including the High 
Court. Sami representatives have had some significant suc-
cesses in this regard, and it has overall been established that 
3 8,766 registered voters and a 58% turnout in 2017 (Sametinget 
2020).
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the rights of reindeer herding Sami to land (that is members 
of a sameby) are based on either use “from time immemo-
rial” or through customary use. In the Nordmaling case 
(Nordmalingmålet, 2011), a group of landowners had initi-
ated a case to stop three samebyar from using some specific 
parcels of land for winter grazing on the basis that these 
had not historically been used by the Sami. In the trials that 
followed, ending up in the High Court, the Sami representa-
tives successfully proved customary use based on historic 
documents.
Sameby members also hold special rights to hunting and 
fishing within their pasture lands. A recent court case adju-
dicated that one northern sameby — Girjas — holds the 
exclusive right to hunting and fishing in the western part 
of their pasture lands, that they may control who can hunt 
and fish on these lands henceforth and that this right is not 
related to the provisions of the Reindeer herding Law, but to 
the use of land since time immemorial (Girjasmålet 2020). 
The consequences of this verdict to other areas, to other 
sectors of the economy or other activities in northern Swe-
den are as yet unclear. However, in common for all cases 
where the rights of the Sami have been considered is that 
the judicial reasoning is specifically tied to existing Swed-
ish laws, although with some limited reference made to the 
international rights framework, for example, in the Girjas 
case. These developments have furthermore contributed to 
the government recently initiating a process of now review-
ing the Reindeer herding Law.
The fact that only a minority of the Sámi may have rein-
deer herding as a livelihood has caused considerable con-
flict. An ongoing court case regarding the right to keep rein-
deer involves the Vapsten sameby (the same involved in the 
(Ågren -v- SWE 2020) case) and another group of Sámi 
— also named Vapsten and with historical links to the same 
area — is illustrative of the complexities that exist (Vapsten 
-v- Vapsten 2020). The district court initially adjudicated 
that both groups have equal rights to reindeer herding in 
the area, although the verdict was appealed, and the court 
of appeal ruled that the case should be reheard by the lower 
court.
In the main a sameby may not engage in any other activ-
ity or business that does not directly relate to reindeer hus-
bandry, and it is not clear if a sameby can enter into contracts 
that in some way diminish/endanger the activity of reindeer 
herding itself (Torp 2018; Brännström and Allard, 2019). 
Individual members of a sameby may, however, engage in 
other activities in his/her own capacity. Substantial reindeer 
herding areas (some 25% of the total pasture areas) are pro-
tected through the Environmental Code (SFS 1998) as being 
“national interests”, that should to the extent possible be 
protected. However, other land uses and/or features are also 
protected in this way (such as areas for leisure activities, 
environmental protection, military use and also including 
mineral deposits, see below), and situations where two or 
more such national interests’ overlap are not uncommon. In 
cases where overlap occurs, the Environmental Code states 
preference for the land use that “best contributes to sustain-
able development”.
Mining and its regulation
The Swedish mining sector is important, and especially 
so in the north where mining companies count among the 
largest employers and where mining is the fundamental rea-
son for the existence of substantial cities (e.g. Kiruna and 
Gällivare).
It is not explicitly stated in law who owns precious min-
erals, referred to as “concession minerals” (e.g. see SWE 
Plmnt (2012)). However, given that the state grants the right 
to explore and exploit, the situation is similar to where min-
erals belong to the state. Mineral projects are regulated by 
the Mineral Law (SFS 1991), which provides security of 
tenure and which overall aims to enable the identification of 
concession mineral deposits and their subsequent extraction. 
The nature and content of the Mineral Law is in this way 
similar to that of most countries which have a substantial 
mining sector (Cameron and Stanley 2017, 72).
Permits for exploration and for mining are provided on 
a first-come, first-served basis, although there are some 
requirements for the applicant to have adequate ability to 
undertake the work, and not previously shown to be unsuita-
ble in this regard (SFS 1991). Exploration may be conducted 
without a preceding Environmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA), although there is a requirement to have a work plan 
accepted before any significant work may start. Two main 
permits are required for mining: (i) an exploitation conces-
sion, granted by the Mining Inspectorate in accordance with 
the Mineral Law (SFS 1991), and with a requirement that 
the application includes a limited EIA which is performed 
to address land use related issues and specifically whether 
mining is an appropriate land use at the proposed location; 
and (ii) an environmental permit, granted by a Land and 
Environmental Court in accordance with the Environmental 
Law (SFS 1998). The latter permit is assessed on the basis 
of a comprehensive EIA.
In cases where relocation of people, business or build-
ings is required, this is addressed as part of the permitting 
process for an exploitation concession. Chapter 2 of the Law 
on Expropriation (SFS 1972) provides for the expropria-
tion of land for businesses and/or activities that are of so-
called national importance. However, mining is specifically 
excluded, and instead, the allocation of land for mining is 
treated in Chapter 9 of the Mineral Law in a so-called land 
designation process. In practice, this means that mining is 
provided with the same priority as land uses of national 
importance — but without the associated and explicit legal 
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reasoning which exists in the Law on Expropriation. In the 
land designation process, a mutually acceptable settlement 
is explicitly encouraged by law, but in cases when no such 
settlement is possible, the Mining Inspector will decide the 
terms. The Mining Inspector’s decisions are informed by the 
provisions in the Law on Expropriation.
As mentioned above, mineral deposits may be classified 
as being of “national interest”, which means that such areas 
enjoy some level of protection from other land use proposals 
that would make future exploitation of the deposit impossi-
ble. Overall, there are no special requirements, taxes or fees 
that apply to mining and nor is there a royalty payable to the 
Swedish state (the state’s revenue from mining is generated 
mainly through profit and income taxes). There is a “mineral 
fee”, a unique feature for Sweden,4 and which comprises 
0.02% of the value of production of which with 2/3 is paid 
to the land owner (in cases when the concession is in an area 
which is owned by a party other than the concession holder) 
and 1/3 to the state, ostensibly to be used to fund mineral 
related research (SWE Plmnt 2004).
International assessments of Sweden
There have been criticisms, from within the UN system, of 
Sweden’s regulation of indigenous rights generally and also 
in relation to mining specifically. Examples from the UN’s 
Human Rights Council include a 2016 report (UN 2016, 
11–13), and numerous recommendations concerning Sami 
rights and ILO169 in the Universal Periodic Review (UN 
2020, 10 & 23).
The bodies which oversee the human rights treaties which 
Sweden has joined have raised concerns regarding the inter-
action between Sámi and mining rights, namely the Com-
mittee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD); 
the Human Rights Committee (CCPR); and the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). The 
recommendations from these bodies constitute their guid-
ance on what Sweden must do to comply with these treaties 
((Concl Obs SWE CERD 2018) [16]–[17]; (Concl Obs SWE 
CCPR 2016) [38]–[39]; (Concl Obs SWE CESCR 2016) 
[13]–[14]). Relevant here, these have included that the 
Swedish nation should review its laws and procedures which 
may impact Sámi interests, including the Mineral Law, the 
Minerals Strategy and the Environmental Code; also that all 
Sámi, including non-reindeer herding Sámi, should enjoy 
equal access to water and land. These treaty bodies have also 
stated that Sweden should consider ratifying ILO 169. There 
is, however, ambiguity in how these bodies frame issues in 
relation to FPIC (and what that requires), evident in these 
three statements that Sweden should:
•“[R]eview existing legislation, policies and practices 
regulating activities that may have an impact on the rights 
and interests of the Sámi people, including development 
projects and extractive industries operations, with a view 
to guaranteeing meaningful consultation with the affected 
indigenous communities aimed at attempting to obtain 
their free, prior and informed consent” (2016, Human 
Rights Committee, emphasis added).
•“Ensure, in law and in practice, that the necessary 
efforts are made to obtain the free, prior and informed 
consent of all Sámi people on decisions that affect them, 
and provide legal assistance in that regard” (2016, Com-
mittee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, emphasis 
added)
•“Take measures to enshrine the right to free, prior and 
informed consent into law, in accordance with interna-
tional standards” (2018, Committee on the Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination, emphasis added)
The Human Rights Committee’s 2016 observations on 
Sweden provide the most relevant guidance here:
•Mining laws, policies and practices which may impact 
Sámi rights or interests of the Sámi people
•Should have “a view to guaranteeing meaningful con-
sultation” with affected communities
•That consultation should be “aimed at attempting to 
obtain their free, prior and informed consent”
•To these three points (made specifically about Sweden) 
should be added a fourth that where a proposed devel-
opment will significantly impact an indigenous group’s 
rights, then their consent ought be obtained before pro-
ceeding — a position understood and advocated by the 
World Bank, International Council of Mining & Metals 
and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development, e.g. IFC (2012) [15] & [12]; ICMM (2013, 
4); OECD (2017, 98).
It is, therefore, these four considerations (and not exclu-
sively the presence or absence of consent) which should 
guide analysis or amendment of Sweden’s mineral laws as 
regards Sámi rights. This is reinforced by a December 2020 
decision of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination which ruled Sweden in breach of its inter-
national obligations concerning its grant of mining-rights 
which would enable significant impacts on reindeer herd-
ing of the Vapsten reindeer herding cooperative (Ågren 
-v- SWE 2020). The decision recorded that there had been 
extensive consultation and review processes under Swedish 
law (both prior to and following the Government’s grants) 
which addressed “some” impacts on reindeer herding and 
associated culture (summarised in (Ågren -v- SWE 2020, 
6.8–6.11)). However the Committee adjudged Sweden in 
breach in two key respects.
4 Though a similar mechanism exists in Finland.
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• Inadequate consultation by the State (or ensuring that 
consultation would occur by the company). The Commit-
tee saw this as necessitating “consultations in good faith 
and with a view to reaching consensus” (6.17), and that 
“environmental and social impact studies should be part 
of the consultation process with indigenous peoples… 
conducted by independent and technically competent 
entities, prior to the awarding of a concession for any 
development or investment project affecting traditional 
territories” (6.18). The Committee rejected the argument 
that the Government could simply choose between com-
peting activities on the basis of its view of public interest: 
“Development and exploitation of natural resources, as a 
legitimate public interest, does not absolve States parties 
from their obligation not to discriminate against an indig-
enous community that depends on the land in question 
by mechanically applying a procedure of consultation 
without sufficient guarantees or evidence that the free, 
prior and informed consent of the members of the com-
munity can be effectively sought and won” (6.20).
• Inadequate protection and remedies for the cultural rights 
impacted by the grant of the mining permits. The Com-
mittee explained the treaty against racial discrimina-
tion required that “where indigenous peoples have been 
deprived of lands and territories traditionally owned 
or otherwise inhabited or used without their free and 
informed consent, the State should take steps to return 
those lands and territories. Only when this is for factual 
reasons impossible should the right to restitution be sub-
stituted by the right to just, fair and prompt compensa-
tion, which should, as far as possible, take the form of 
lands and territories” (6.27).
Sweden’s mining procedures and indigenous 
rights
Below, we investigate whether the rights of the Sámi are 
equal to that of other stakeholders in the permitting pro-
cess for mineral projects and further whether the protection 
thus afforded is in line with applicable parts of the existing 
international indigenous rights framework more broadly, as 
described in “Existing standards and procedures” section.
Sámi rights in the permitting process for mineral 
projects
In Sweden, the issuance of exploration licenses is governed 
primarily by the Mineral Law, and licenses are generally 
issued if the application is concerned with ground which is 
“open” (that is exploration is allowed, and there is no exist-
ing mineral tenure) and if the applicant is deemed suitable 
and capable. However, the practice is that relevant land and 
stakeholders (including the relevant sameby and in also the 
Sámi Parliament) are informed and provided the opportunity 
to object to the application (SGU, 2016, 15). Furthermore, 
an approved work plan is required before any exploration 
work; and the relevant sameby and the Sámi Parliament are 
provided with an additional opportunity to comment and/or 
object before the workplan can be accepted (Ch 3, §5a, §5c). 
If there are objections, then consultations may be performed 
to achieve agreement. If no agreement is achieved, then the 
applicant may request the Mining Inspectorate to decide 
the matter without further consultation. Although there 
are limited opportunities to stop an exploration project, the 
Mining Inspector may decide that conditions be attached to 
the approved licenses and work plans (e.g. in practice, there 
are regularly requirements for posting a financial guarantee 
and there may be stipulations of when in the year specific 
activities can take place). In this respect, the situation for 
Sámi stakeholders is comparable to that of other users of 
land, whose consent is also not explicitly required (although 
negotiation is encouraged before exploration). Thus, con-
sultation with the relevant sameby is required, and there is 
no significant and formal discrimination in how Sámi rights 
are addressed in the permitting of exploration licenses. And, 
given the nature of mineral exploration, such activities are 
unlikely to cause “significant impacts” or “substantially 
affect” indigenous peoples’ rights.
The conditions for the application and issuance of mining 
licenses are mainly governed by the Mineral Law, but also 
by parts of the Environmental Act (namely Chapters 3 and 
4 that are concerned with protected areas, and how to set 
priorities for land use, §15 of Chapter 5 which is concerned 
with impacts on water and Chapter 6 which contains provi-
sions for the consultation to be performed). Thus, an appli-
cation for a mining license requires an EIA to be performed, 
and in the northern half of Sweden, this EIA typically also 
specifically assesses impacts on reindeer herding, although 
it generally does not assess any social and cultural impacts. 
Allocation of land, and any resettlement and compensation 
issues are also considered and decided upon in the mining 
license application process, and not in the environmental 
permitting process (see below). This, in turn, means that 
mining license application process is crucial for reindeer 
herding and overall Sámi interests (Raitio et al. 2020).
The mining license permitting process includes require-
ments for the proponent to consult widely, including with the 
relevant sameby, and that the Sámi Parliament be informed. 
Both the sameby and the Sámi Parliament also have the right 
to appeal. There is evidence that project proponents have, 
of late, made stronger efforts to assess impacts on reindeer 
herding and suggest mitigating and/or rehabilitative meas-
ures in this regard (Kløcker Larsen et al. 2018; Tarras-Wahl-
berg 2014). However, although the relevant sameby must 
be consulted by the project proponent, and Swedish legal 
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procedure provides them that right, they have of late often 
chosen not to participate in such processes (Kløcker Larsen 
et al. 2018). Furthermore, the requirement to consult with 
the sameby is directed towards the project proponent, and 
not the Swedish state.
A holder of a mining license may initiate a process for the 
designation of land rights for mining and associated activi-
ties (e.g. processing). As mentioned above, it is encouraged 
that the license holder negotiates with landowners and other 
rights holders (including the relevant sameby) in good faith 
to reach agreement. However, if no agreement is reached, 
then the Mining Inspectorate will decide land allocation 
(Ch 9, §2), as well as the associated levels of compensa-
tion which in turn are based on the expected impacts to the 
owner of the land and/or items to be compensated. For the 
sameby, the compensation will generally be related to com-
pensation for economic damages caused and/or the loss of 
pastures. There is no avenue for obtaining compensation for 
any cultural and/or social impacts that may occur. If, once 
mining has started, the sameby finds that the compensation 
is inadequate, its sole legal avenue is to sue the mining com-
pany for damages in a civil court, and there are examples of 
such processes.5
The above suggests there is no significant and formal dis-
crimination in how Sámi rights are addressed in the process 
for awarding a mining license. But, in line with the Ågren 
-v- Sweden decision, this may be insufficient as Sámi inter-
ests require “different” and special treatment compared to 
other property owners (see, i.e. 6.14–6.17). Furthermore, 
Lawrence and Moritz (2019) argue that the consultative 
initiatives undertaken by project proponents are insufficient 
to meet FPIC requirements as consent is not required (nei-
ther in law nor in practice), and the state has no role and/
or obligation to ensure that consent is sought. However, the 
latter does not negate the possibility that, even given current 
legislation and practice, there may be cases where sufficient 
consultation in line with FPIC may still have taken place, if 
the impacts on reindeer herding activities are not significant 
enough for consent to be required (see “Relevant interna-
tional standards and practice” section above).
Another important objection to the existing permitting 
process could also be that the Sámi organisations (that is 
the relevant Sameby) invited to take part in the process may 
not accurately reflect the opinions and wishes of the larger 
Sámi community. This, in turn, is an issue that is not directly 
related to the Mineral Law but to more substantial and wider 
legal issues regarding the rights of the Sámi in Sweden.
National interest areas for minerals and reindeer herding 
may overlap, and in such cases Chapter 3 of the Environ-
mental Code stipulates that the activity that best contrib-
utes to longer-term sustainable development should have 
precedence. This, in turn, leads to what have proven to be 
difficult judgements. The relevant authorities have in fact 
been unable to resolve these and in turn have referred them 
to central government for decision.6 Only one such judge-
ment has actually been done, and it is the same project which 
became the subject of the Ågren -v- Sweden decision, where 
the mining interest was deemed to have precedence largely 
because of its perceived socio-economic benefits, and with 
acknowledgement that reindeer herding over the specific 
area would be made impossible for an extended — although 
limited — period of time.
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimina-
tion subsequently found Sweden in breach (see “Relevant 
international standards and practice” section above), which 
leaves the situation of the company having complied and 
obtained permission within Swedish domestic law, but the 
Swedish state currently in breach of international law. The 
lack of any more examples negates the possibility of any 
wider evaluation of whether outcomes in this regard may 
be in line with international indigenous rights framework.
Overall many stakeholders have little to lose by opposing 
a mining project. This is the case for sameby, other Sámi, 
and indeed other local land owners. The government’s gen-
eral operations provide all Swedes, including the Sami, with 
the necessary public and/or other services, and these are 
not dependent on negotiations or agreements with resources 
projects or developers, e.g. UN (2013) [24]. Further, there is 
no tradition and/or legal stipulations that provide for com-
munities and/or other stakeholders and resource developers 
negotiating for benefits to be associated with a specific pro-
ject such as in countries where negotiations between project 
proponent and indigenous representatives may be concerned 
with increased local benefits (e.g. employment, business, 
services, as well as in some cases even basic services like 
education and health (e.g. Dupuy 2014)).
The international rights framework places significant 
importance on compensation and redress for impacts 
incurred (consider Ågren -v- Sweden 2020, 6.2.7) on indig-
enous rights holders. As shown above, these types of issues 
often form an important part of the interactions and overall 
relationships between mining (and other) companies and 
affected samebyar. The international rights framework also 
places significant emphasis on indigenous peoples being 
able to wherever possible, participate in the benefits of 
5 Including compensation decided upon in court that relates to the 
Vapsten sameby, and two companies Lappland Goldminers (since 
bankrupt) and Dragon Mining; and where in both cases the courts 
ruled that further compensation be paid, although less than what Vap-
sten sued for.
6 Several companies’ applications for mining concessions are or have 
been considered by government in recent times, including those of 
Nickel Mountain, Jokkmokk Iron, Vilhelmina Mineral and Boliden.
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mineral projects. There is no royalty stipulated in the Min-
eral Law, but landowners may either obtain the mineral fee, 
or — in addition to compensation to any damage caused 
— have the opportunity to strike a deal with the project 
proponent to sell or lease the land or, if this is not possi-
ble, be compensated for their land in a process which is led 
by the Mining Inspector.7 The sameby have no such formal 
legal possibility and thus have little to gain financially from 
welcoming a mineral project on their pasture lands, as the 
best it can hope for is compensation for foreseen impacts 
decided upon by the Mining Inspector, any further damages 
that it may obtain through civil court action and/or any fur-
ther compensation that the mining company may agree with 
on a voluntary basis.
This situation is not only discriminatory, but it may also 
contribute to the present situation where the Sámi Parlia-
ment and affected samebyar seldom find good reason to 
welcome and/or accept mining related projects, even if the 
effects on both local communities and wider society may 
appear to be beneficial.
In this aspect, where essentially all projects meet with 
resistance from the Sámi, mining differs from other sectors 
and land uses in northern Sweden. For example, the for-
estry sector and the relatively newer wind power sector are 
performed over areas that are much larger than those used 
for mining (see Table 1). One author’s experience in, and 
knowledge of, land and resources issues in Sweden over the 
past 15 years has shown that forestry and wind operations 
— although sometime also the subject of Sámi protest and 
objections — have had comparatively greater success (than 
mining) in engaging with Sami and reaching agreements 
about land access and operations (H. Tarras-Wahlberg, pers. 
comm.). Their relative greater success in being able to use 
land in reindeer herding areas have different reasons. One 
fundamental aspect is likely to be the fact that both forestry 
and windfarms rely on a priori land ownership — which 
is difficult to challenge through legal means — rather than 
being reliant on obtaining concessions from the state, and 
then being designated land. The success of forestry in this 
regard is also likely due to it being possible to use the same 
land for both mining and reindeer herding (albeit that for-
estry is known to have significant impacts (e.g. Berg et al. 
2008). It is furthermore probably related to the existence of 
large number of private forest owners — so not only is the 
sector important economically (on par with mining), it also 
has a large support among wider society and is politically 
difficult to resist. Wind power similarly enjoys strong politi-
cal support, and further, as such projects are privately led 
endeavours that do not involve a state-controlled commodity, 
it may be easier for project proponents to propose attractive 
commercial terms to other land users and/or owners.
In the next section, we consider what the stakes are for 
existing land users in northern Sweden, with a special focus 
on mining, if more effective measures to safeguard indige-
nous rights were implemented more fully through, for exam-
ple, the ratification and implementation of ILO169.
The interests and implications around change
The analysis above suggests that in the main, the rights 
of the reindeer herding Sámi are not given comparatively 
lesser weight or being discriminated against compared to 
other land right holders in the mineral exploration permit-
ting process. This conclusion may be surprising to some 
but is a reflection of the nature of the Mining Law. Sweden, 
like many countries, has a mining law which encourages 
mining (through private rights of exploration and extrac-
tion) frequently prioritising these over other uses of land 
(e.g. Southalan (2012, 47–49)). Sweden’s mining law aims 
to ensure that exploration and possible subsequent mining 
for concession minerals be made possible even in places 
where landowners and land right owners oppose such activi-
ties. The reason why such a law exists is that economical 
deposits of precious minerals are rare — which necessi-
tates exploration over extensive areas — and that the values 
generated by mining such deposits can be very significant, 
and therefore it is seen to be in society’s best interest that 
they be exploited. That still holds, but more recent interna-
tional practice and guidance emphasises the importance of 
Table 1  Comparisons of land use, and pertinent financial data in min-
ing, exploration, forestry, wind power and reindeer herding
1 Land use and areas under exploration permits 2018 (SGU 2020); 
2land use 2015 (SCB 2020); 3land use 2020 (Energimyndigheten 
2020); 4land use 2019 (Sametinget, 2020) — note that all this area is 
not possible to use for reindeer herding, due to incompatibility with 
other land users and overall fragmentation of the landscape (Österlin 
and Raito, 2020); 5GDP (production side) 2017 (SCB 2020); 6explo-
ration expenditure 2018 (SGU 2020); 7total turnover of reindeer herd-
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7 Note that this process is not governed by the Law on Expropriation 
(SFS 1972), as mining is specifically excluded from consideration in 
that law.
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sustainable development, and therefore greater attention to 
social and environmental aspects as well as financial returns.
However, samebyar do not have legal possibilities of shar-
ing the benefits of mining — by being a partner in a project, 
receiving a mineral fee, having the possibility of striking a 
deal with the mine proponent for relinquishment of land use 
rights or at the very least to be formally expropriated. The 
best they can hope for is to through the permitting process 
be compensated for impacts caused, or through a mining 
company agreeing to compensate in excess of this through 
a voluntary initiative, and/or — as a last resort — sue a 
mining company for identified damages caused once project 
has been initiated. Similarly, the Sámi Parliament (and by 
inference non reindeer herding Sámi) do not receive any 
direct benefits from allowing a mining project to go ahead.
So, what would be the impact if existing Sámi right hold-
ers (that is the reindeer herders, through the samebyar) were 
given the same rights as landowners in the permitting pro-
cesses? In evaluating this, it is important to establish that 
the areas we are considering are large. This, in turn, follows 
as reindeer herding as an important part of Sámi livelihood 
and culture has long enjoyed significant levels of acceptance 
and legal protection, with the result that reindeer herding 
Sámi’s rights to pasture lands are extant over most of their 
historical lands which, in turn, cover slightly more than half 
of Sweden’s territory (see Table 1 below). Thus, in contrast 
to most other countries with colonial history, there has not 
been any spatially significant extinction of indigenous land 
use rights in Sweden, although as the existing rights are non-
exclusive (usufruct), there has been a significant reduction 
in the level of Sámi control of the land furthermore, some 
of this land cannot be used for reindeer herding for various 
reasons, including other and incompatible land uses (e.g. 
cities, industries, infrastructure, power generation etc.). The 
Swedish situation also differs to that of Norway and Finland, 
where Sami rights have been provided with relative greater 
importance in certain areas where Sami make up a compara-
tively larger proportion of the inhabitants (i.e. in Finnmarka 
Norway and in three northern municipalities in Finland).
Nevertheless, the impact of Sámi right holders being were 
given equal rights as landowners in the permitting processes 
for mining, as it is currently regulated, would probably be 
insignificant. This follows from the fact that whilst the cur-
rently active mines generate substantial values, they use only 
comparatively small areas (197  km2 in total designated for 
active mines and actual land used less than that, Table 1), 
although the impacts stretch beyond those immediate areas, 
with estimates of avoidance zones for reindeer caused by 
mining ranging — depending on specific circumstances — 
from 1–2 km around smaller mines in forests (Johnson et al., 
2015; Polfus m.fl., 2011) up to 11–14 km around large open 
pit mines on the Arctic tundra (Boulanger et al., 2012). In 
all, this means that the commercial value of the land used 
and the size of compensation to be paid for other associated 
impacts are unlikely to be large in comparisons to the values 
generated.8 Similarly, for mining operations to pay mineral 
fees also to Sámi right holders would entail comparatively 
small sums of money (the total mineral fee was SEK12 mil-
lion in 2017).
The set up alluded to above — with Sámi reindeer herd-
ers and landowners given parity in the mineral legislation 
— may well find support within wider Swedish society. For 
Sámi stakeholders, thus, the mining sector need not neces-
sarily be seen as a significant adversary in their struggle for 
better recognition of land rights.
The same does not hold true for other land users and 
important parts of the economy in northern Sweden. To 
provide Sámi right holders equal rights as land owners in 
areas where both forestry and reindeer herding is undertaken 
(likely to be well over 100,000  km2 and held by numerous 
different land owners; see Table 1) or where wind power 
projects have been implemented in reindeer herding areas 
(likely more than 1,000  km2, and growing; see Table 1) 
would entail the transfer of sizeable wealth and associated 
power to a relatively small number of individuals who are 
member of a sameby (some 4,600 individuals), and such a 
measure may also struggle to obtain wider societal support.
Conclusions
Swedish Sámi reindeer herdes have usufruct rights to 
extensive land areas. In relation to mineral exploration 
activities, these usufruct rights have similar protections 
as those of landowners, both in terms of consultation 
requirements and compensation for economic damages 
that may be caused. Thus, the reindeer herding Sámi are, 
in the main, not treated worse than landowners in the 
mineral exploration permitting process. The consulta-
tive procedures that are in place address some aspects of 
the international rights framework, but not all aspects of 
FPIC. Consent is not required (under Swedish law), and 
the requirements that exist in terms of consultation are 
directed towards project proponents rather than the state. 
However, where exploration activities are unlikely to cause 
significant impacts on Indigenous parties, there is no inter-
national precedent that a failure to seek consent is a breach 
of international law.
In the permitting process for actual mining, the require-
ments regarding consultation and compensation for dam-
ages, the usufruct rights of reindeer herding Sámi are also 
8 Note that some areas may have special cultural values for specific 
groups, such as the Sámi. Thus, indigenous cultural interests in land 
can be site-specific non moveable.
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equally well protected as those of landowners. However, 
parity with landowners in this regard is insufficient in cases 
where significant impacts can be expected, and further meas-
ures would need to be introduced to reach the requirements 
of FPIC and the associated need to obtain consent. Again, 
the requirements that exist in terms of consultation fall upon 
the proposed mine operators, and not the state, and this issue 
also would need to be addressed. Furthermore, there is sig-
nificant discrimination against Sámi rights holders when 
it comes to the issue of being able to have a share in the 
benefits of mining projects. Impacted reindeer herders have 
no such option, whereas landowners do. Lastly, the permit-
ting processes do not normally include any consideration of 
social and/or cultural impacts, which is a clear shortcoming 
compared to what is required to be in line with the indig-
enous rights framework.
If mineral regulations were changed so that the Sámi rein-
deer herders were given parity with landowners, and the 
other shortcomings identified above would be addressed, the 
impacts on the mining sector could be fairly insignificant. 
This follows from mining creating large values but being 
a minor user of land. Thus, risks for significant negative 
impacts on mining do not constitute a strong reason for 
Sweden to not fully implement the indigenous rights frame-
work and its requirements regarding FPIC. However, the 
same does not hold true for other significant sectors of the 
economy which use more extensive land areas. For these, 
parity between landowners and Sámi reindeer herders would 
entail a considerable transfer of resources and associated 
power to the relatively small number of Sámi that are mem-
bers of a sameby. This suggests that calls for changes to be 
made specifically to mineral-related legislation to resolve 
wider indigenous land right issues are in part misguided. To 
resolve such wider objectives requires fundamental issues of 
how extensive and strong the Sámi’s rights to land are. This 
is, in turn, no straightforward task, and a number of particu-
larities may make it difficult to achieve. Those particularities 
include the following:
• Historic Sami land use have not been made extinct in any 
of its historic extension and, thus, that the areas of land 
potentially affected are very large.
• The Sami land rights that exist today are specifically tied 
to reindeer herding, which in turn means that most with 
Sami heritage face fundamental obstacles in taking part 
in any land restitution related processes.
• The history of dispossession of the Sami included periods 
when land and resources was shared with both Swedes 
and other minorities, which makes assigning land rights 
a complex and difficult process.
• The forces for assimilation have been strong and there 
are few areas where those who sustain Sami culture and 
traditions make up a more significant part of the popula-
tion.
The ongoing efforts by the Swedish government to 
improve consultation with the Sámi and to review the rein-
deer herding law are unlikely to be sufficient to align Swe-
den with the international indigenous-rights framework. To 
achieve such an aim would require a more ambitious pro-
cess — probably involving numerous court cases where his-
toric uses of land are assessed, and land rights determined. 
Mining specific land use issues will be significant in such 
a process, but would not constitute a significant obstacle to 
progress, fundamentally due to the small areas that are being 
used for mining.
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